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Science Friction: Phenomenology,
Naturalism and Cognitive Science
MICHAEL WHEELER
Abstract
Recent years have seen growing evidence of a fruitful engagement between phenom-
enology and cognitive science. This paper confronts an in-principle problem that
stands in the way of this (perhaps unlikely) intellectual coalition, namely the fact
that a tension exists between the transcendentalism that characterizes phenomenol-
ogy and the naturalism that accompanies cognitive science. After articulating the
general shape of this tension, I respond as follows. First, I argue that, if we view
things through a kind of neo-McDowellian lens, we can open up a conceptual
space in which phenomenology and cognitive science may exert productive con-
straints on each other. Second, I describe some examples of phenomenological cog-
nitive science that illustrate such constraints in action. Third, I use the mutually
constraining relationship at work here as the platform from which to bring to light
a domesticated version of the transcendental and a minimal form of naturalism
that are compatible with each other.
1. Beginning in the Middle
Recent years have seen growing evidence of a fruitful engagement
between phenomenology in the contemporary European tradition
(that is, phenomenology as pursued by thinkers such as Husserl,
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty) and cognitive science.1 This intri-
guing development marks a positive shift in the diplomatic relations
between these two mighty intellectual edifices, since, historically
1 For book-length examples, see: F.J. Varela, E. Thompson and E.
Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); S. Gallagher, How the Body Shapes
the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); M. Wheeler,
Reconstructing The Cognitive World: The Next Step (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2005); E. Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology,
and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2007); S. Gallagher and D. Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: an
Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (London and
New York, NY: Routledge, 2008); and M. Rowlands, The New Science of
the Mind: from Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2010). This is not an exhaustive list.
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speaking, their ‘conversations’ were either frosty or downright
hostile. For example, phenomenological insights were often
wielded in order to expose certain supposed limits, or even the funda-
mental misguidedness, of cognitive science as a branch of knowledge.
The benchmark for such arguments was probably set by Hubert
Dreyfus’s seminal, phenomenology-driven analysis of why artificial
intelligence (AI) has so far failed to produce machines that are
smoothly and flexibly sensitive to context-dependent relevance, in
the way that human beings routinely are.2 One might wonder why
it should matter to cognitive science if the research programme of
creating intelligent machines (or of creating them in a certain way)
is shown to be suspect. The fact is that AI, in its role as a source of
basic concepts and models for mechanistic explanations of intelli-
gence, is plausibly at the very core of cognitive science,3 so any injur-
ious attack on AI is arguably a blow to the very heart of cognitive
science. Dreyfus’s critique was just such an attack.
Or at least, that’s what some people thought. Many AI prac-
titioners, it must be said, took a rather different view, accusing
Dreyfus of various misunderstandings regarding AI, of targeting ob-
solete programs, and/or of attempting to replace good (even if provi-
sional and incomplete) science with (what they took to be) the
nebulous mystery-mongering of phenomenology.4 As I mentioned,
diplomatic relations were not exactly cordial.
The historical furore surrounding Dreyfus’s critique of AI, as fas-
cinating as it is, is not the topic of this paper, although some of
Dreyfus’s philosophical views and arguments will figure importantly
inwhat follows.The point in recalling the fracas here is only to illustrate
the fact that the recent enthusiasm for combining phenomenology and
cognitive science, even if it seems to some thinkers to be yielding expla-
natory insights, is far from uncontroversial. There remains work to be
done to establish beyond doubt that the philosophical credentials of
2 See e.g. H.L. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of
Artificial Reason (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1972); H.L. Dreyfus,
Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time,
Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990, chapter 6); H.L. Dreyfus,
What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
3 For this view of AI, see e.g.M.A. Boden,MindAsMachine: AHistory
of Cognitive Science, 2 vols. (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006, chapter
4).
4 For evidence and discussion of this response, see Boden, Mind As
Machine, 838–49.
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any such alliance are in good order. In what follows, I shall endeavour
to carry out some of that work.
As our opening, bite-sized history lesson indicates, we are joining
the story of phenomenology and cognitive science in the middle.
We are at a juncture where, as I like to think of things, two sorts of
friction are in evidence. The first, which onemight describe as a posi-
tive kind of friction, concerns the ways in which advances in our un-
derstanding of intelligent and skilful human activity may be achieved
by allowing cognitive science and phenomenology to constrain or
influence each other’s projects and insights, that is, to exert pro-
ductive cross-disciplinary friction on each other. The second sort
of friction, which one might describe as negative in character, con-
cerns the nagging suspicion that something here is not right, that
there is a friction, in the sense of a tension or antagonism, between
cognitive science and phenomenology, one that can be locked up
only for so long before it escapes again to scupper any cosy rapproche-
ment. At the point where these two kinds of friction meet (‘collide’
might be better) is the question of whether or not it is possible to re-
concile the transcendental character of phenomenology with the com-
mitment to naturalism that, as I shall claim, inevitably accompanies
any research programme worthy of the name ‘cognitive science’.
The prospects for such reconciliation will be the ultimate theme of
this paper, so let’s bring the central issues into sharper focus by
way of a preparatory tour of the intellectual terrain.
2. Something Nasty in the Woodshed
The fundamental character of phenomenology may be revealed, if we
pause for a moment to confront the argument of one thinker who
remains staunchly unconvinced by the strategy of deploying phe-
nomenological insights within cognitive science. That thinker is
Robert Rupert.5 During his critical response to my own attempts to
develop a Heideggerian cognitive science,6 Rupert highlights my
claim that our cognitive-scientific explanations should not be system-
atically at odds with the results of phenomenological analysis, a claim
inspired by (although not identical to) McDowell’s thought that our
causal explanations of behaviour should not be phenomenologically
5 R. Rupert,Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
6 Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World.
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off-key7 (more on McDowell later). Rupert’s objections to my claim
turn partly on the observation that, even though subjects’ reports
of their own cognitive processing are sometimes used as starting
points for, or as data to be accounted for by, cognitive psychology,
and even though introspection has occasionally proven useful in cog-
nitive psychology as a guide to cognitive mechanisms, the fact
remains that ‘cognitive psychology does not give trumping power
to such reports or take them as revealing, in some unqualified way,
the details of the cognitive processes occurring at the time of the
report’.8 Moreover, Rupert notes, ‘a large body of empirical results
directly calls into question the reliability of subjects’ reports on
their own cognitive processing’.9 Rupert is surely spot-on when he
observes that, for most purposes anyway, cognitive psychology has
drawn sceptical conclusions about such first-person reports. So, if
phenomenology were nothing more than routine first-person intro-
spective reporting of the kind Rupert targets, the claim that phenom-
enology might in general be a useful tool for constraining or shaping
explanations in scientific psychology would be highly dubious, if not
manifestly crazy. In that event, Rupert would be correct, and this
would be a very short paper.
Although there is undoubtedly something right about Rupert’s
reasoning, our present investigation is far from over; for, in the
end, Rupert is, I think, insufficiently sensitive to the nature of phe-
nomenology, as practised centrally by Heidegger and others. To
explain: One way of depicting phenomenology is as a theoretical
(or, depending on one’s account of what constitutes a theory, as a
meta-theoretical) philosophical enterprise that, through an attentive
and sensitive examination of ordinary human experience, aims to
reveal the transcendental yet historical conditions which give that
experience its form. The historicality in the picture here is ultimately
a function of the hermeneutic character of human sense-making.
Indeed, on the present view, phenomenological analysis, as an inter-
pretative activity, is itself inevitably guided by certain historically
embedded ways of thinking that the phenomenologist brings to the
task, meaning that its results remain ceaselessly open to revision, en-
hancement and replacement. The historicality of sense-making is an
issue to which we shall return. For the moment, it is the transcenden-
tal dimension of phenomenology that concerns us.
7 John McDowell, ‘The Content of Perceptual Experience’, The
Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1994), 190–205.
8 Rupert, Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, 157.
9 Ibid.
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Although the transcendental conditions of possibility whose arti-
culation is the goal of phenomenological analysis are presupposed by
ordinary experience, which means that they must, in some sense,
accompany that experience, they cannot simply be read off from
the surface of ordinary experience via some pre-theoretical introspec-
tive glance. Indeed, if the phenomenologists are right, the conditions
in question are standardly concealed from any such untrained inward
glance, which is why a disciplined and careful analysis of experience is
needed to reveal them, and why phenomenology is not equivalent to
routine introspection.
To illustrate this point, let’s recall that Heidegger’s phenomenolo-
gical magnum opusBeing and Time10 has a spiral structure in which a
sequence of interpretations of the conditions for human sense-
making produces a systematically evermore illuminating comprehen-
sion of those conditions. In the opening phase of this interpretative
dynamic, Heidegger claims that our everyday meaningful engagements
with entities should be understood in terms of the now-famous phe-
nomenological categories of readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand.
In the domain of readiness-to-hand, the skilled agent is absorbed in
the context-dependent hitch-free manipulation of equipmental
entities according to holistic networks of social norms, in such a
manner that the subject-object distinction, and thus representational
consciousness, is absent. For example, while engaged in trouble-free
texting, the expert smartphone user will have no explicit conscious
recognition of the screen or the (perhaps virtual) keyboard, in the
way that one would if one simply stood back and thought about
them. Nor indeed will she have any experience of herself as a
subject over and against her ongoing activity. Dreyfus11 calls this
kind of activity absorbed coping, and notes that it is regulated by (i)
the human expert’s capacity to sense deviations from a contextually
determined optimal balance with her environment, and (ii) her
ability to smoothly adapt her behaviour to improve her performance
and thus reduce her sense of being out of balance. In stark contrast to
10 M.Heidegger,Being andTime, trans. J.Macquarrie and E. Robinson
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962 [1927]).
11 See e.g. Herbert L. Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how
Fixing it would Require Making it more Heideggerian’, in P. Husbands,
O. Holland and M. Wheeler (eds.), The Mechanical Mind in History
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 331–71, reprinted in J. Kiverstein
and M. Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science (Basingstoke:
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 62–104. A shortened version appears under
the same title in Philosophical Psychology, 20 (2007), 247–68. Another
version appears in Artificial Intelligence, 171 (2007), 1137–60.
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the domain of readiness-to-hand, the domain of presence-at-hand is
characterized by detached subjects who represent entities explicitly as
objects with context-independent properties (measurable size, absol-
ute spatial position, and so on). The key point about all this is that
even the essentially preliminary structures of readiness-to-hand and
presence-at-hand (‘preliminary’ in the sense that they are conditions
of possibility stationed at the very first level of the ever-widening her-
meneutic spiral) are the products of careful phenomenological analy-
sis; they (or the entities as revealed by them) cannot simply be read off
from philosophically unexamined consciousness. As Heidegger puts
it, ‘pre-ontologically [i.e., before analysis]… the entities which we en-
counter in concern [e.g. as ready-to-hand] are proximally hidden’.12
Indeed, Heidegger’s recognition of this proximal concealment means
that he embraces an ontologically oriented version of the point that
our naïve first-person experiential reports are likely to be misleading.
To see why this is, note that when subjects make first-person reports
on their own experience of absorbed coping, the very absorption
in the world that characterizes such activity will be disrupted,
meaning that the ready-to-hand nature of the equipmental engage-
ments in question is ripe to be obscured through an interpretation
of that experience in terms of present-at-hand structures such as
subject and object. Disciplined phenomenological analysis corrects
for this concealment of readiness-to-hand.
What the foregoing considerations tell us is that, in its transcenden-
tal dimension, phenomenology is not a matter of subjects merely re-
porting on their own cognitive processing, in the way that has been
shown to be suspect by cognitive psychology. So, from what we
have seen so far, Rupert’s argument against the claim that cognitive
science should refrain from being phenomenologically off-key falls
short of its intended target.
That said, there is, as Aunt Ada Doom once reminded us, some-
thing nasty in the woodshed. It is surely plausible that a healthy
respect for cognitive science requires a generic commitment to
some variety of naturalism regarding human psychological phenom-
ena. In other words, any philosophy of mind, cognition or human
sense-making that rides shotgun with cognitive science must be nat-
uralistic in form. So what is it for philosophy to be naturalistic in
form? The animating principle of naturalism is that philosophy
should be continuous with empirical science. Of course, all this does
is make us wonder what ‘continuous’ means here. This is a tricky
matter that will exercise us in what follows. What we can say at the
12 Heidegger, Being and Time, 96.
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outset is this: however one chooses to unpack the notion of continuity
in one’s understanding of naturalism, it must have the consequence
that constraints are placed on our philosophical theorizing about
some set of phenomena by those results from empirical science that
concern the same or related phenomena.13
If, as I have suggested, taking cognitive science seriously requires a
commitment to naturalism about psychological phenomena, then the
prospects for combining phenomenology and cognitive science rest,
in part, on whether or not transcendental phenomenology is, or can
be made, compatible with that naturalism. This is where we catch a
glimpse into the woodshed, because, on the face of things, the phe-
nomenologist will want to insist that the distinctive mode of human
sense-making that is characteristic of cognitive science, which one
might gloss as the objectification ormathematization of psychological
phenomena, such that those phenomena may be revealed in terms of
laws, algorithms, computations and/or statistical principles, will
itself presuppose certain transcendental conditions of possibility
that cannot themselves be brought within the explanatory reach of
that scientific sense-making. For example, Matthew Ratcliffe14
argues as follows: in a Heideggerian phenomenological framework,
science (including cognitive science) reveals phenomena as present-
at-hand; but phenomenological analysis tells us that presence-at-
hand, as a mode of human intelligibility, tacitly presupposes a
sense of belonging to the world on the part of the human sense-
maker (roughly, this is the idea that the fundamental structures of in-
telligibility are constituted by us, which means that they are, in a way,
familiar to us); and this condition of belonging to the world, because
13 Some philosophers will want to complain that I have omitted a
crucial element of naturalism, namely a commitment to some form of phy-
sicalism; for a characterization of naturalism that explicitly includes such a
commitment, see e.g. K. Sterelny, The Representational Theory of Mind
(Oxford and Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990). My own current
view (which represents a shift since Wheeler 2005) is that this extra require-
ment is either unnecessary (since some form of physicalism will be assumed
by science, which, on continuity grounds, means that a commitment to
whatever form of physicalism that is will become a constraint on philosophi-
cal theorizing) or wrong (since science will embrace the existence and the
causal-explanatory powers of non-physical stuff, which means that continu-
ity with science will not require a philosophical commitment to
physicalism).
14 Matthew Ratcliffe, ‘There can be no Cognitive Science of Dasein’, in
Kiverstein and Wheeler, Heidegger and Cognitive Science, 135–56.
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it is presupposed by the very practice of scientific explanation, cannot
itself be explained by science.15
The woodshed door is now wide open. Given that phenomenology
takes itself to be identifying transcendental conditions for intelligibil-
ity that are presupposed by, among other things, scientific expla-
nation, and given that naturalism requires that constraints be placed
on philosophical understanding (of whatever form) by science, it
looks as if the phenomenologist and the naturalist will each demand
the unqualified right to trump the other’s results. Thus we arrive at
what is in truth a turbo-charged version of Rupert’s point that
there is a fundamental disagreement here over who gets to call the
shots. And however one dresses up that disagreement, it doesn’t
look like the basis for a happy and productive intellectual partnership.
In what follows, I shall endeavour to make the woodshed benign.
First, I shall argue that, if we view things through a kind of neo-
McDowellian lens, we can open up a conceptual space in which phe-
nomenology and cognitive science may exert friction of the positive
kind on each other. Second, I shall describe some examples of what
I shall henceforth call phenomenological cognitive science that illus-
trate this positive friction in action. Finally, I shall use the mutually
constraining relationship at work here as the platform from which to
bring to light a domesticated version of the transcendental and a
minimal form of naturalism that are compatible with each other.
3. A Neo-McDowellian Lens
Although, in his paper ‘The Content of Perceptual Experience’16,
John McDowell is not concerned with phenomenology in the con-
temporary European tradition, he nevertheless draws an important
distinction that we can creatively appropriate to help us in our
quest to relieve the tension between phenomenology (so construed)
and cognitive science. The distinction in question is between two
kinds of understanding – constitutive understanding and enabling un-
derstanding. Constitutive understanding, including the constitutive
understanding of psychological phenomena, is a characteristic target
of philosophy, although presumably not onlyof philosophy. It concerns
15 Although this is the kernel of Ratcliffe’s argument, I have suppressed
some potentially important details. For a fuller discussion, see Michael
Wheeler, ‘Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged) Heresies’, in
Kiverstein and Wheeler, Heidegger and Cognitive Science, 176–212.
16 McDowell, ‘The Content of Perceptual Experience’.
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the identification, articulation and clarification of the conditions that
determine what it is for a phenomenon to be the phenomenon that it
is (e.g. what it is for a certain kind of creature to competently inhabit
its world). Enabling understanding is the characteristic target of
empirical science, including cognitive science, although presumably
not only of empirical science. It reveals the causal elements, along
with the organization of, and the systematic causal interactions
between, those elements, that together make it intelligible to us
how a phenomenon of a certain kind could be realized or generated
in aworld like ours (e.g. how some creature-specificmode of competent
world-inhabiting is causally enabled in a purely physical universe).
The distinction between constitutive and enabling understanding,
as manifested in the vicinity of mind, is nicely illustrated by McDowell
when he writes:
Of course, there is a relevant organ, the brain, and none of what I
have said casts doubt on investigating how it works. But on pain
of losing our grip on ourselves as thinking things, we must dis-
tinguish inquiring into the mechanics of, say, having one’s
mind on an object from inquiring into what having one’s mind
on an object is.17
Now if, as seems correct, phenomenology as we are thinking of it may
be interpreted as seeking to provide us with a distinctive (transcen-
dental) kind of constitutive understanding of human psychological
being (in the widest sense of ‘psychological’), and if, as also seems
correct, cognitive science seeks to provide us with an enabling under-
standing of (i.e. the mechanics of) the same set of phenomena, then
reflecting on the relations between constitutive understanding and
enabling understanding will help us to chart the relations between
phenomenology and cognitive science. In this context, the quotation
fromMcDowell reproduced immediately above might be interpreted
as suggesting that, in his view, constitutive understanding and enabling
understanding are wholly independent of each other. However, that
would be a misinterpretation of McDowell’s position; for he actually
claims that the two kinds of understanding will standardly engage in
a process of mutual constraint and influence that he tags with the enti-
cing phrase ‘a perfectly intelligible interplay’.18 Although McDowell
himself says disappointingly little about the details of this interplay,
17 John McDowell, ‘Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind’, in M. De
Caro andD.Macarthur (eds.),Naturalism in Question (Cambridge,MA and
London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 104.
18 McDowell, The Content of Perceptual Experience’, 197.
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its broad contours seem clear enough, so we can begin with those,
stated specifically in relation to phenomenology and cognitive
science. Along one dimension of the interplay, there will be con-
straints that flow from phenomenology to cognitive science. This is
because phenomenology, as a source of constitutive understanding,
will isolate and articulate phenomena for which the corresponding
cognitive science will then try to identify the underlying causal
mechanisms. Along the other dimension of the interplay, there will
be constraints that flow from cognitive science to phenomenology.
This is because the causal profiles discovered by cognitive science
may sometimes lead us to revise our conception of what the phenom-
ena under investigation are. These general characterizations of the
bi-directional influences in play here are no more than the abstract
bones of a view. To put some flesh on the skeleton, we need to
sample phenomenological cognitive science itself.
4. The Interplay in Action
Let’s begin with a case in which a constitutive understanding,
achieved through phenomenological analysis, exerts positive friction
on cognitive science, by acting as a constraint on what might count as
a compelling enabling account of a target phenomenon. That phenom-
enon is the fluid and flexible context-sensitivity of everyday skilled
human activity.
Even in the sorts of dynamically shifting scenarios in which we
often find ourselves, human beings are extraordinarily proficient at
maintaining psychological and behavioural focus on what is contex-
tually relevant in a situation, while ignoring what is contextually irre-
levant. In his analysis of such dynamic relevance-sensitivity, Erik
Rietveld19 observes that, in a specific situation, some affordances
(possibilities for action presented by the environment)20 are no
more than mere possibilities for action, where the qualification
‘mere’ signals the fact that although the agent could respond to
them, such a response would be contextually inappropriate. For
example, the table at which I am working currently affords ‘dancing
19 Erik Rietveld, ‘Context-Switching and Responsiveness to Real
Relevance’, in J. Kiverstein and M. Wheeler, Heidegger and Cognitive
Science, 105–34.
20 The term ‘affordance’ is famously due to J.J. Gibson. See, e.g. J.J.
Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Boston: Houghton
Miffin, 1979).
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on top of’, but that possibility is not a feature of the paper-writing
context in which I am presently embedded, so right now I am not
primed to respond to it. Some affordances, however, precisely
because they are directly contextually relevant to the task at hand, or
have proved to be relevant in similar situations in the past, prime us
for action by being what Rietveld calls bodily potentiating. It is these
bodily-potentiating affordances that Rietveld, drawing on Merleau-
Ponty,21 identifies as solicitations. In Rietveld’s framework, figure soli-
citations are those affordances with whichwe are explicitly concerned,
in some extant context of activity. Thus, for example, in my current
paper-writing context, my keyboard summons typing from me,
because my bodily potentiation for the affordance in question has
been activated. By contrast, ground solicitations are those with
which we are not currently explicitly concerned, but for which we
are nevertheless currently bodily potentiated, and which are thus
poised to summon us to act. For example, the tea cup on my table
that is peripheral with respect to my current focus of activity is never-
theless a feature of my paper-writing context and so is poised to
summon me to act in appropriate ways. The shifting kaleidoscope
of figure and ground solicitations, plus the fact that mere affordances
can transform into solicitations as contexts change, provides the phe-
nomenological structure of our skilled relevance-sensitive activity.
Crucially, according to Merleau-Ponty, the skilled know-how that
is manifested in patterns of solicitation and summoning is not
somehow internally represented by the agent.22 To illustrate this idea,
consider an example from Shaun Gallagher.23 Phenomenological
analysis teaches us that the skilled mountaineer does not build an
inner representation of the mountain before her and infer from that
plus additionally represented knowledge of her own abilities that it
is climbable by her. Rather, from a certain distance, in particular
visual conditions, the mountain ‘simply’ looks climbable to her.
Her climbing know-how is ‘sedimented’ in how the mountain looks
to her and thus may solicit the action of climbing from her. So what
21 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith
(London and New York: Routledge, 1962 [1945]).
22 For this point, see e.g. Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and
how Fixing it would Require Making it more Heideggerian’, 340.
23 Shaun Gallagher, ‘Are Minimal Representations still
Representations?’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16
(2008), 351–69, special issue on ‘Situated Cognition: Perspectives from
Phenomenology and Science’, M. Ratcliffe and S. Gallagher (eds.).
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are the phenomenologically identified transcendental conditions for
this nonrepresentational experiential structure? In relation to this
question, Dreyfus writes that ‘all coping… takes place on the back-
ground of [a] basic nonrepresentational, holistic, absorbed, kind of
intentionality, which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world’.24 This in-
troduces us to the phenomenon of the background. As described by
phenomenologists, the background is the vast, holistic,
indeterminate, and therefore unrepresentable, web of embodied,
psychological, social and cultural structures that constitute one’s
world and that are implicitly presupposed by concrete examples of
human sense-making. It is, as Taylor25 puts it, ‘an unexplicated
horizon’ providing ‘the vantage point from out of which’ every
experience is relevant to one in a certain way. And the associated
phenomenon of knowing one’s way around the background
(Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, as Dreyfus interprets it, and, in
effect, what Ratcliffe calls our sense of belonging to the world – see
earlier) amounts to one’s nonrepresented, indeed one’s nonrepresenta-
ble, familiarity with one’s world. Dreyfus calls the exercise of this
nonrepresentational know-how background coping.26 It is, then, the
configuration of the skilled mountaineer’s background and her fam-
iliarity with that configuration which determine that her experiential
encounter is of the mountain as being climbable by (i.e. as potentially
soliciting climbing from) her.27
24 Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
Require Making it more Heideggerian’, 345–6.
25 Charles Taylor, ‘Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger’, in
C. B. Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge
and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 325.
26 Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
Require Making it more Heideggerian’.
27 Here I do not have the space to discuss in detail the arguments that
might carry us from ‘vast and holistic’ to ‘indeterminate’ and, ultimately,
to ‘unrepresentable’. For present purposes it is enough to register (i) the
general thought, which is surely plausible enough, that massive holism
and indeterminacy are obstacles to representation, (ii) the fact that phenom-
enologists, especially those of a Heideggerian persuasion, often adopt a non-
representational constitutive account of human sense-making on precisely
those grounds, and (iii) the fact that, as we shall see, a nonrepresentational
constitutive account of sense-making has, in some quarters, placed a con-
straint on the cognitive-scientific account of the enabling mechanisms
underlying relevance-sensitivity. That said, it is worth noting that the
central considerations in the frame here are Heidegger’s account of everyday
contexts as massively holistic networks of meanings, coupled with his
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So, phenomenological analysis, a form of constitutive understand-
ing, reveals background coping to be a transcendental condition for
relevance-sensitive activity, and, moreover, characterizes such
coping as essentially nonrepresentational in character. If we now acti-
vate the constitutive-to-enabling dimension of our neo-McDowellian
interplay, the job for cognitive science is to specify the causal elements
and their organization that make it intelligible to us how background
coping could be realized in a world like ours. With due caution, and
with caveats about defeasibility, the intelligibility condition in force
here can plausibly be met in those cases where we are able to specify
a candidate mechanism for background coping that, in some non-
trivial way, is structurally isomorphic to the target structure as
characterized by phenomenology.28 What we are looking for, then,
is a nonrepresentational mechanism that makes the relevance-
sensitivity of ordinary human activity unmysterious.
Although Dreyfus doesn’t explicitly articulate any between-level
constraint flowing from phenomenology to cognitive science, in the
way that I just have, the fact remains that an implicit commitment
to such a constraint on his part would explain why, when he discusses
the kinds of mechanisms that might underlie our capacity for back-
ground coping, he turns to the neurodynamical framework developed
byWalter Freeman.29 According to Freeman, the brain is a nonrepre-
sentational dynamical system primed by past experience to actively
pick up and enrich significance. It is a system whose constantly shift-
ing attractor landscape causally explains how newly encountered sig-
nificances may interact with existing patterns of inner organization to
create new global structures for interpreting and responding to
stimuli. As Dreyfus puts it, when considering the kind of bodily po-
tentiating affordances highlighted earlier:
If Freeman is right […] our sense of other potentially relevant
familiar situations on the horizon of the current situation,
might well be correlated with the fact that brain activity is not
simply in one attractor basin at a time but is influenced by
other attractor basins in the same landscape, as well as by other
admittedly sketchy treatment of what he calls value-predicates; Heidegger,
Being and Time, 97, 132. For discussion, see e.g. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-
World, chapter 6; Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World, chapter 7.
28 For a more careful justification of this appeal to structural isomorph-
isms, see Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World, 225–36.
29 See e.g. W. Freeman,How Brains Make Up Their Minds (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000).
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attractor landscapes which under what have previously been
experienced as relevant conditions are ready to draw current
brain activity into themselves.30
Dreyfus’s Freeman-inspired model thus plausibly captures an
important dimension of the mechanisms underlying our relevance-
sensitive behaviour, by showing us how flexible relevance-sensitivity
in response to shifting patterns of solicitation may be enabled by a
nonrepresentational neural economy of reconfigurable attractor land-
scapes. It is arguable, however, that the resulting picture of the mech-
anisms underpinning background coping is ultimately incomplete.
Here I want to focus on one aspect of this alleged incompleteness,
by raising the possibility that the blanket anti-representationalism
of Dreyfus’s account is, in truth, misguided, and that in proactive
as opposed to reactive cases of contextual shifts, representational re-
sources, paradigmatically in the form of (what I shall call) preparatory
embodied routines, may sometimes reconfigure the background so as
to promote future behavioural success.31 This is an interesting pro-
spect in itself, but themain point of exploring it here is that, following
some phenomenological ground-clearing, it will allow me to give an
example in which an inter-level constraint flows not from phenomen-
ology to cognitive science, but rather in the reverse direction.
To bring our putative representational contribution into view, let’s
begin with the observation that skilled sportsmen and sportswomen,
actors and actresses, dancers, orators, and other performers often
execute ritual-like gestures or other fixed action routines as perform-
ance-optimizing elements in their pre-performance preparations,
especially when daunting or unfamiliar conditions are anticipated.
Thus, as John Sutton points out, expert batsmen in cricket use
30 Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would
Require Making it more Heideggerian’, 360.
31 This particular idea is developed and defended in more detail in
Massimiliano Cappuccio and Michael Wheeler, ‘Ground-Level
Intelligence: Action-Oriented Representation and the Dynamics of the
Background’, in Z. Radman (ed.), Knowing without Thinking: Mind,
Action, Cognition, and the Phenomenon of the Background (Basingstoke:
Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 13–36. For additional considerations regarding
the causal basis of relevance-sensitivity, which explain why a key contri-
bution will additionally be made by a kind of intrinsic context-embedded-
ness that is realized by non-Dreyfusian mechanisms of special-purpose
adaptive coupling, see Wheeler, ‘Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged)
Heresies’.
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preparatory embodied routines to reset their response profiles at key
moments in the game. As Sutton observes:
When the match situation is changing rapidly and continually –
over the crucial dying overs of a decisive one-day game, for
example – good players will be constantly resetting their response
repertoire in ways which may have been discussed or partly
planned out in advance, either deliberately or simply as the
result of the sedimented history of relevant experience. This
doesn’t mean deciding in advance that only one stroke is allow-
able “no matter what,” but rather altering the probabilities of at-
tempting certain shots to certain ranges of possible deliveries […]
One successful case was when, during the one-day internationals
before the 2005 Ashes series, Andrew Strauss set himself more
than once to get way across to the offside, outside the line of
good-length balls from Jason Gillespie and use the pace to lift
them over fine leg, a shot unthinkable in less audacious
circumstances.32
For another example, consider the way in which King George VI,
before broadcasting his historic announcement that the United
Kingdom was entering the Second World War, furiously repeated
certain tongue-twisters in an effort to overcome his relentless
stutter.33 In cases such as these, the extant local context of activity,
far from smoothly summoning appropriate behaviour, actually
hinders such behaviour to such an extent that the skilled agent’s
response is to suspend that particular pattern of direct coupling
with his or her environment, and to use embodied routines in an
attempt to reconfigure the local background into a more favourable
set of solicitations into which to transfer his or her performance.
The context-shifting at work here is thus not a reactive response to
changing environmental circumstances, but rather a proactive intelli-
gent strategy for adaptively structuring behaviour.
32 John Sutton, ‘Batting, Habit, and Memory: The Embodied Mind
and the Nature of Skill’, Sport in Society 10 (2007), 763–86, quotation
from page 775. Sutton’s example may be opaque to those readers who
have not been initiated into the wonders of the incomparable sport of
cricket. The key point of the example is that the batsman in question,
Strauss, increased his scoring possibilities by expertly using his pre-shot
bodily positioning and posture to alter the kind of shot that would be soli-
cited from him by a certain sort of ball, as bowled by Gillespie.
33 As immortalized in the 2010 movie The King’s Speech. For further
discussion, see Cappuccio and Wheeler, ‘Ground-Level Intelligence’.
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How is this phenomenon to be explained? In order to establish a
more favourable local configuration of the action-soliciting back-
ground, the intelligent agent must distance herself from the operative
solicitations and summonings that are hindering, or that would
hinder, her skilled performance. To appreciate what this process of
‘distancing’ involves, we can draw on Heidegger’s analysis of the
phenomenon of un-readiness-to-hand.34 According to Heidegger,
when absorbed coping is disturbed by broken or malfunctioning
equipment, discovered-to-be-missing equipment, or in-the-way
equipment, our encounters with entities have the character of un-
readiness-to-hand, a phenomenological domain in which entities
are revealed as presenting us with context-specific practical problems
to be solved. With the agent no longer fully absorbed in hitch-free
skilled activity, a kind of cognitive distance between that agent and
her world is opened up, in the form of a nascent subject-object dis-
tinction. At this point, the agent-world distinction may become
ever more pronounced with increasing levels of disturbance, until
eventually the entities under study are encountered by the agent-
as-subject as removed from the settings of everyday practical con-
cerns altogether, and thus as fully-fledged present-at-hand objects.
Alternatively, the cognitive distance involved in the problem-
solving phase may be eliminated, as absorbed coping is re-established
by the agent’s problem-solving measures. I suggest that, phenomeno-
logically speaking, the ‘distancing’ dimension of preparatory embodied
routines may be understood on the model of un-readiness-to-hand,
even though, in the case of such routines, the ‘distancing’ in question
is proactive rather than reactive in nature.
So, how is it that an agent is able to gain competent and appropriate
epistemic access to its world, in cases where it is not merely dis-
tinguishing itself from that world, but distinguishing itself from
that world in a particular way – that is, precisely as a proto-subject
distinguished from a collection of independent proto-objects?
Although an answer to this question may not strictly necessitate the
presence of cognitive structures that stand in for or encode worldly
states of affairs, that is, of representations, it certainly warmly
invites such a story. Therefore, we appear to be warranted in treating
preparatory embodied routines as representing background struc-
tures, in the form alternative sets of solicitations. It is with this sug-
gestion, however, that we run headlong into a problem; for if the
phenomenological analysis of the background presented earlier is
correct, then the background is not merely unrepresented, it is
34 Heidegger, Being and Time, 102–7.
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unrepresentable. How can preparatory embodied routines represent
the background, if the background is unrepresentable?
It is here that work in the sub-field of AI known as situated ro-
botics35 has plausibly made an important contribution to the concep-
tual toolkit available to the phenomenologist. In designing complete
autonomous robots that are capable of integrating perception and
action in real time so as to generate fast and fluid embodied adaptive
behaviour, situated roboticists have shunned the classical cognitive-
scientific reliance on detailed inner world models, on the empirical
grounds that such structures are computationally expensive to build
and, in dynamic environments, prohibitively difficult to keep up to
date. The classical thought, that intelligent agents should build com-
plete, detailed representations of the world, has been replaced by a
different thought, namely that intelligent agents should regularly
sense their environments to guide their actions. As the roboticists
concerned are fond of pointing out, regular sensing is computation-
ally cheap and the environment is always up to date. It is this distinc-
tive behaviour-generating strategy, which Brooks tagged with the
memorable phrase, ‘using the world as its own best model’, that
marks out situated robots as situated.36
One might think that situated robotics, as characterized, identifies
a class of wholly nonrepresentational enabling explanations. However,
although many nonrepresentational mechanisms have been explored
by the roboticists concerned, sensorimotor coupling of the kind
advocated by such models has not always excluded representational
structures. To cite an old (but far from rare) example of representational
35 See, most famously, Rodney Allen Brooks, ‘Intelligence Without
Representation’, Artificial Intelligence 47: 1–3 (1991), 139–159, and
‘Intelligence Without Reason’, in Proceedings of 12th International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (San Mateo, California: Morgan
Kauffman, 1991, 569–95). Both of these seminal papers in situated robotics
are reprinted in Brooks’ Cambrian Intelligence: the Early History of the New
AI (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
36 In arriving at his enabling-level idea that the world is its own best
model, it is possible that Brooks may even have been influenced, perhaps
indirectly, by Dreyfus’s phenomenological claim that ‘The meaningful
objects […] among which we live are not a model of the world stored in
our mind or brain; they are the world itself’; Dreyfus, What Computers
Still Can’t Do, 265–6. For a description of the historical context that
makes this a genuine possibility, see Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI
Failed and how Fixing it would Require Making it more Heideggerian’,
331–7.
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situatedness that I have used a number of times before,37 Nicolas
Franceschini and colleagues built a robot that successfully
accomplishes the goal of navigating its way to a light source while
avoiding obstacles.38 In order to achieve the obstacle avoidance
aspect of this goal, the robot identifies contrast points in the optic
flow that were generated by its own bodily movement at the previous
time-step. Taking these contrast points to indicate the presence of
obstacles, it builds a temporary ‘snap map’ of regions to be
avoided, located in terms of roughly specified bearings relative to
the robot’s own body. That information is then fused with infor-
mation concerning the angular bearing of the light source (supplied
by a supplementary visual system) and a direction-heading for the
next movement is generated. That heading is as close as possible to
the one that would take the robot directly towards the light source,
adjusted so that it avoids all detected obstacles. Following a short
movement along that heading, the process begins again with the
building of the next temporary snap map.
For present purposes, the key point about all this is that the kind of
enabling-level representation – sometimes called an action-oriented
representation39 – that is exemplified by the Franceschini et al. maps
does not aspire to the sort of complete or detailed modelling of the
world that tends to paralyze real-time action. Indeed, neither the
shape nor the absolute position or orientation of detected obstacles is
calculated or stored. Instead, a sparse, outcome-directed, egocentric
and context-specific encoding supports a behavioural solution that,
rather than being specified in advance in some internally represented
objective space, is dynamically constructed through precisely the kind
of repeated sensorimotor interaction that is indicative of situatedness.
This enabling-level, action-oriented representational solution is
relevant to the apparent tension that exists between, on the one
hand, the phenomenological analysis of the background as unrepre-
sentable and, on the other, the representational understanding of
background-reconfiguring strategies such as preparatory embodied
routines. What our foray into situated robotics demands of the phe-
nomenologist is that she separate out (a) the suggestion that we might
37 See e.g. Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World, 196–8.
38 N. Franceschini, J.M. Pichon and C. Blanes, ‘From Insect Vision to
Robot Vision’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, series B 337
(1992), 283–94.
39 See e.g. A. Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, And World
Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Wheeler
Reconstructing The Cognitive World.
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engage with the background by determinately representing that struc-
ture in its entirety, from (b) the suggestion that we might engage
with the background by selectively representing egocentrically speci-
fied, goal-specific aspects of it, and so facilitate an ongoing coupled
interaction with structures that are sampled from it by way of those
representations. Strategy (a) looks all set to run aground conceptually
on the massive holism and indeterminacy of the web of conditions
that constitute the background (just as it runs aground empirically
at the enabling level). Strategy (b), which takes its cue from action-or-
iented representation, promises success precisely because the rep-
resentational resources it deploys, such as preparatory embodied
routines, encode solutions the exact form of which will be determined
by the ongoing trajectory of our competent engagement in the world,
rather like a traffic detour sign that, given one’s practical know-how,
indicates the way home. On the model of (b), representations do not
detach the agent entirely from the background that defines her world
(as might be concluded if representations are thought of solely as
present-at-hand structures), but instead serve to reconfigure the soli-
citations which delineate her operative background, as part of her
strategic inhabiting of the background as a whole. This implies that
there are cases in which one should expect phenomenological analysis
to uncover representations whose contents are sparse, outcome-
directed, egocentric and context-specific. In other words, in rejecting
blanket anti-representationalism regarding background coping, our
understanding of the transcendental conditions for intelligent behav-
iour, as targeted by phenomenological analysis, has been shaped by
whatwe have discovered in cognitive science about the kinds ofmech-
anisms that may causally enable that same behaviour.40
I have now given a detailed example of each of the general constraints
that are operative in our neo-McDowellian intelligible interplay.
These are not isolated cases. For example, in the constitutive-to-
enabling direction, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi41 argue that,
since disciplined phenomenological analysis suggests an experiential
profile according to which perception is always perspectivally
40 In previous treatments (e.g. Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive
World, ‘Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged) Heresies’.) I have presented
the discovery of constitutive-level representations with an action-oriented
profile as hailing largely from a creative phenomenological unpacking of
Heidegger’s notion of un-readiness-to-hand. These treatments were incom-
plete in that they were insufficiently sensitive to the extent to which this is a
case of the science driving the philosophy.
41 Gallagher and Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind, 10.
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incomplete (i.e. we never see all of an object at once), even though
objects are presented to us in perception as having aspects that,
right now, we cannot see, the cognitive science of perception must
respect and account for that profile. And in the enabling-to-constitu-
tive direction,HelenaDe Preester42 presents an analysis in which a con-
sideration of mirror neuron research is used explicitly to drive the
phenomenological-level claim that Merleau-Ponty’s account of self-
other understanding as world-mediated presupposes a Husserlian
notion of pairing or bodily similarity. Such examples could be
multiplied
Where are we in our analysis? Once we view the relations between
phenomenology and cognitive science through a neo-McDowellian
lens, it turns out that what is in force is a mutually constraining dia-
logue between those different intellectual frameworks that leaves no
room for the kind of unqualified trumping of science by phenomen-
ology of the sort that disturbs Rupert, but which might seem to be
required by transcendentalism. Equally, however, that same dialogue
leaves no room for the kind of unqualified trumping of phenomenol-
ogy by science of the sort that will upset the transcendental phenom-
enologist, but which might seem to be required by naturalism. If this
is right, however, then the philosophical waters stationed between cog-
nitive-scientific naturalism and contemporary European phenomenol-
ogy in which we are swimming seem to have become worryingly more,
rather than comfortingly less, murky. What have we done?
5. Minimal Naturalism
As noted earlier, the animating principle of naturalism is that philos-
ophy should be continuous with empirical science. In the present
context, that thought gets translated into the demand that phenomen-
ology should be continuous with cognitive science. Oneway of apply-
ing this demand would be to understand continuity in terms of the
across-the-board reduction of pre-scientifically identified psycho-
logical phenomena to scientifically identified states and processes.
But this sort of hard-headed reductionism is not the only option.
As an alternative, we might read continuity with empirical science
as requiring no more than consistency with such science. Let’s call
the resulting position minimal naturalism.
42 Helena De Preester, ‘From Ego to Alter Ego: Husserl, Merleau-
Ponty and a Layered Approach to Intersubjectivity’, Phenomenology and
the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008), 133–142.
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Minimal naturalism allows that, in specific cases, philosophically
articulated psychological phenomena may be reduced to scientifically
identified states and processes, since reduction, as distinguished from
elimination, will trivially guarantee the consistency of philosophy
and science.43 Nevertheless, by taking continuity to require only con-
sistency, minimal naturalism does not necessitate across-the-board
reductionism in this area. Looked at another way, the minimalist pos-
ition countenances the existence of psychological domains in which
scientific-reductionist demands are inappropriate, without that fact
necessarily posing any threat to the continuity constraint that anima-
tes naturalism. For example, the minimal naturalist might well hold
that evolutionary psychology delivers important information about
the cognitive mechanisms responsible for our moral deliberations.
Moreover, that enabling understanding of the causal processes at
work may identify, or place limits on, the kinds of factors to which
a constitutive account of our moral reasoning ought to count us as
being sensitive. But, given an interpretation of continuity in terms
of consistency, even the latter contribution from psychological
science, which exploits one of our channels of influence identified
previously, doesn’t compel the minimal naturalist to endorse other,
less palatable views that might emerge in the general area of evol-
utionary naturalism, for example, that what a human being should
judge to be morally correct should be reduced to whatever provides
the best available outcome with regard to biological fitness.
One might worry that minimal naturalism, as I have just character-
ized it, waters down the scientific acid to such an extent, that the pos-
ition now on offer, however attractive it may be as a philosophical
view, no longer warrants the title ‘naturalism’. Any such worry is, I
think, misplaced, because the way to understand the all-important
consistency condition is in terms of a further principle, one that has
obvious naturalistic bite. That principle is (what I once dubbed44)
the muggle constraint. To explain: In J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter
43 Somewhat mysteriously, the distinction between reducing a
phenomenon and eliminating that phenomenon is not always respected in
philosophy. Nevertheless, that distinction is a crucial weapon in, for
example, the arguments for eliminative materialism about the propositional
attitudes, as developed by Paul Churchland. As he puts it, ‘folk psychology
is a radically inadequate account of our internal activities, too confused and
too defective to win survival through intertheoretic reduction’ (my emphasis);
see Paul Churchland, ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
Attitudes’, The Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1981), 67–90, quotation from
page 72.
44 Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World, 4–5.
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books there are two co-existing and intersecting worlds. The first is
the magical realm, populated by wizards, witches, dragons, demen-
tors, and the like. This is a realm in which, for example, getting
from A to B can be achieved by flying broomstick, the floo network
or apparition, and in which one object can be transformed into
another by a transfiguration spell. The second world is the non-
magical realm, populated by non-magical folk called muggles –
muggles like us. Muggles are condemned to travel by the boringly
familiar (to us) kinds of planes, trains, and automobiles, and to
operate without the manifest benefits of supernatural object-altering
powers. Now, if you want an understanding of how muggles work,
you had better not appeal to anything magical. So one’s explanation
of some phenomenon meets the muggle constraint just when it
appeals only to entities, states and processes which are wholly non-
magical in character. But how are we to tell if the muggle constraint
is being met on some particular occasion? The most reliable check
we have is to ask of some proposed explanation (philosophical or
otherwise), ‘Does it conflict with science?’. If the answer is ‘yes’,
then that explanation fails to pass the test, and must be rejected. As
it concerns us here, then, the muggle constraint runs from science
to philosophy. It demands that, if and when there is a genuine
clash between philosophy and empirical science (in the sense that
philosophy demands the presence of some entity, state, or process
which is judged to be inconsistent with empirical science), then it
is philosophy and not science that must ultimately concede,
through the withdrawal or the revision of its claims.45
The inclusion of the qualification ‘ultimately’ in the preceding sen-
tence is both well-motivated and problematic. It is well-motivated
because even the most enthusiastic naturalist should not expect
good philosophy to concede to bad science, so some sort of caveat
is needed to protect naturalism from having that unwanted conse-
quence. But it is problematic, because it is a reasonable inference
from the history of science, which is a veritable graveyard of theories
45 My claim that we should unpack naturalism not in terms of
reduction, but in terms of the general conditions under which philosophy
should concede its ground, bears an affinity with Huw Price’s formulation
of what he calls ‘subject naturalism’ as being the view that “[s]cience tells
us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions
of philosophy conflict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way”;
Huw Price, ‘Naturalism without Representationalism’, in D. Macarthur
and M. de Caro, Naturalism in Question, quotation from page 4. This is
not to say that my minimal naturalism is equivalent to Price’s subject natur-
alism; it is not.
156
Michael Wheeler
that were once accepted as true but which were subsequently dis-
carded as false, that any scientific view we might happen to accept
as true or as approximately true right now will turn out to be false
sooner or later. Under these circumstances, one might think that
the only science that really has the warrant to demand that philosophy
should concede in the face of a clash with it is some final science (final
in the sense that we know it to be complete and correct). But if that is
the full force of the continuity that defines minimal naturalism, then,
assuming the idea of a final science even makes sense46, the worry is
that minimal naturalism can offer us no intellectual guidance as to
how we should respond to clashes between science and philosophy
that happen along the way to that final science (e.g. that are happen-
ing right now). Fortunately, for the minimal naturalist, there is a fall-
back position available to her, one that restores her teeth. According
to that position, if and when there is a genuine clash between philos-
ophy and some eminently well-supported (by the data) empirical
science, then there is good reason for the philosopher to at least
revisit her claims, with a view to withdrawal or revision. The envi-
saged clash, on its own anyway, puts no such pressure upon the
scientist.
To generalize an earlier point, the minimal naturalism that I have
just sketched tolerates the possibility of cognitive domains that are in-
sulated from the reach of empirical cognitive science, simply because
the application of science does not stretch as far as the questions that
delineate those domains, meaning that, for those particular deploy-
ments of philosophical reflection, there is no room for any conflict
with science. One plausible candidate for such insulation would be
the moral correctness or otherwise of at least many ethical judgments,
although there is an important caveat. As mentioned earlier, to the
extent that one’s constitutive account of our ethical lives makes pre-
dictions about properties in the world to which our moral reasoning
capacities ought to be sensitive, that account will be susceptible to re-
vision in the wake of our best current scientific psychology telling us
that we are cognitively incapable of tracking those properties, since,
on minimal naturalist grounds, that empirical result ought to be suf-
ficient for one to cast a critical eye over one’s ethical theory. That
caveat aside, in addition to allowing the possibility of a kind of
limited insulation of parts of phenomenology from cognitive
science, minimal naturalism endorses the claim that
46 This parenthetical remark regarding the very idea of a final science
signals a hesitancy which will become important later, when we revisit the
understanding of science required by minimal naturalism.
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phenomenological analysis may place defeasible constraints on cogni-
tive science, since phenomenology legitimately articulates the consti-
tutive character of phenomena for which cognitive science is tasked
with supplying enabling explanations.
The minimalist picture on offer will, of course, fail to satisfy those
of a more radical naturalistic persuasion. Nevertheless, as far as I can
tell, having a healthy respect for science, to the extent of giving good
science a certain priority over philosophy in domains where the two
sources of knowledge may potentially conflict, is what a sober natur-
alism ought to require of us. And that does not compel us to worship
unthinkingly at the altar of science.What it does demand, however, is
that any constitutive understanding delivered by philosophy – for
example, the accounts of human psychological phenomena delivered
by phenomenological analysis –must be open to the possibility of re-
vision or replacement, in the wake of what eminently well-supported
empirical science – for example, eminently well-supported cognitive
science – tells us, either at the time or indeed subsequently. The
worry in the present context, of course, is that even this minimal nat-
uralism, as I have characterized it, is inconsistent with the transcen-
dental aspect of phenomenology. Our final task for this paper,
then, is to allay that fear.
6. The Domesticated Transcendental
It is obvious enough that there will be notions of the transcendental
that succeed in screening off the transcendental conditions of possi-
bility of psychological phenomena from scientific influence
altogether. And it would of course be a disaster for the present
project if all notions of the transcendental were like that. However,
just as hardcore blanket reductionism about psychological phenom-
ena emerged as an optional aspect of naturalism, I shall (more contro-
versially, I suppose) suggest that the same is true of the screening off
of the transcendental from scientific influence. Indeed, as unlikely as
it may seem, given the ‘anti-science’ spin that is all too often put on
his philosophy, I shall argue that it is precisely Heidegger’s transcen-
dental phenomenology that provides a model for how this might be
so.
It is here, finally, that we return to the historicality that, as I men-
tioned earlier, characterizes Heidegger’s notion of the phenomenolo-
gical transcendental. According to Heidegger, historicality is part of
the existential constitution of human existence, which is just another
way of saying that the transcendental conditions of possibility of
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specific enactments of human sense-making do not stand outside of
human history. Indeed, those conditions of possibility are concretely
embedded in our history. Consider, for example, the account of tem-
porality as a transcendental condition of human sense-making given
in Being and Time.47 Heidegger strongly suggests that the most ab-
stract form of temporality, which is thrown projection plus falling/
moment-of-vision, will be a universally shared feature of human
sense-making. So far, this schema doesn’t much look like a recipe
for concrete historical embeddedness, whatever the technical
language of thrown projection plus falling/moment-of-vision might
mean (more on which in a moment). In truth, it is debatable
whether the historicality that characterizes Heidegger’s phenomenol-
ogy leaves any room for the claim that there are universal features of
human experience, but fortunately we don’t need to engage with that
thorny exegetical issue here, because even if the most abstract form of
temporality is, in some sense, a human universal, the specific transcen-
dental structures in virtue of which events of human sense-making take
the particular forms that they do (the culturally dependent, content-
laden elements that, as it were, fill the slots in the abstract temporality
schema) are undoubtedly historically embedded. To see why this is,
we need to say a little more about the phenomena of thrownness, pro-
jection and falling/moment-of-vision.48
Thrownness – predominantly the past dimension of the human
sense-maker’s temporality – concerns the fact that the human
sense-maker always finds herself embedded within a pre-structured
field of intelligibility into which she has been enculturated.
Projection – predominantly the future dimension of the human
sense-maker’s temporality – concerns the way in which she interprets
herself in terms of culturally determined possibilities for action that
hail from that same field of intelligibility. And falling and moment-
of-vision – predominantly the present dimension of the human
sense-maker’s temporality – concern (roughly) the ways in which
she either loses sight of her thrown and projective character due
to the distractions of the now as established by the crowd (falling)
or comes to own her particular thrown and projective character
by appropriating the past in the present as a set of templates for
47 Heidegger, Being and Time.
48 Heidegger’s full account of temporality is much more complicated
than my necessarily brief treatment here will suggest. For my own more de-
tailed interpretation, see M. Wheeler, ‘Martin Heidegger’ Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, fall 2011, E.N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/heidegger/.
159
Science Friction
self-interpretation onto which she may creatively project herself
(moment-of-vision). On the Heideggerian model, then, the content
of each transcendentally presupposed temporal dimension of
human sense-making is culturally conditioned. Now for the crucial
point. A consequence of this temporality-driven cultural condition-
ing of the transcendental is that although there will be specific
factors that are transcendentally presupposed by any particular act
of sense-making, there is no expectation that those factors will be per-
manently fixed for all human psychological phenomena across space
and time. Instead, they will be susceptible to variation and transform-
ation, as the various structures and background attitudes characteriz-
ing different cultural ways of being differ over space and shift over
time. And once the transcendental is domesticated in this way,
there should be no appetite for insulating the transcendental from
science. After all, science as a practice is itself an activity located
within human history, one whose results often shape the ways in
which human beings, as enculturated agents, make sense of things
through the temporalizing dimensions of thrown projection and
falling/moment-of-vision.
It is worth pausing here, in order to get clear about the claim on the
table. According to Heidegger, science reveals entities as present-at-
hand objects, that is, as the bearers of context-independent, paradig-
matically measurable properties. In order to achieve this, science
must function ontologically so as to suspend or to strip away the hol-
istic contextual networks of culturally and historically conditioned
meanings that characterize our ordinary ready-to-hand and un-
ready-to-hand dealings with entities as equipment (as tables,
chairs, computers, baby-bouncers, kettles, tourniquets, and so on).
What I am proposing goes beyond this picture, by suggesting that
our scientific understanding of the world can sometimes invade,
and then be absorbed by, or integrated with, the cultural structures
that, for Heidegger, constitute the transcendental conditions of every-
day sense-making. Unless I am missing something, this process of in-
vasion, absorption and integration does not have the consequence that
science is a social construction, or at least, not in any pernicious, ob-
jectivity-in-science-undermining sense (more on this sort of issue
below). Rather, it shows us how science influences the suite of socially
and historically embedded transcendental structures in virtue of
which we find the world to be intelligible. To give just one
example. In most forms of western culture, we would not interpret
a spate of sudden infant deaths as being caused by the actions of
blood-sucking witches, and we take the behaviour of the inhabitants
of Tlaxcala, Mexico, who do offer such an interpretation, to be an
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instance of a common pattern in which tragic human misfortune is
blamed on supernatural assault.49 One does not do proper justice to
this inter-cultural difference by depicting it as a quarrel between
alternative explanations, one of which must be false. That would
place the dispute too close to the periphery of the sense-making prac-
tices concerned. What one needs to say is that the culturally embedded
structures that condition the most widespread of the sense-making
practices that characterize western culture simply do not leave room
for supernatural assaults by blood-sucking witches, precisely because
those structures have been invaded, in a way that the sense-making
practices of the Tlaxcala residents have not, by what contemporary
science tells us is possible.
I have argued that the transcendental conditions of possibility that
are the business of a properly understood domesticated transcenden-
tal are open to the possibility of revision from science, at least in
certain contexts, and regardless of what Heidegger himself may
have said about such things. If this is right, then, as a special instance
of the general dynamic indicated, and for just those versions of phe-
nomenology that are based on, or open to, the domesticated form of
the transcendental, cognitive-scientific research on the causal en-
abling conditions of human psychological phenomena may some-
times shape our phenomenological understanding of the historical
transcendental structures in virtue of which those phenomena take
the forms they do.
A critic heremight complain that the general claim for which I have
argued is not quite the claim that is needed, if we are to accept that
minimal naturalism and the domesticated transcendental are compa-
tible with each other. The driving thought here is that the process of
incorporation that I have described is an essentially undirected,
meme-like affair that may occur through all kinds of contingent his-
torical accidents. For example, in a particular culture, a scientific idea
may grip the public consciousness through a combination of en-
trenched science, high quality popular science writing, a well-oiled
public relations machine, and mass media (including social media)
coverage, such that, after a bedding down period, that idea becomes
part of that culture’s core way of being open to the world. So much
may well be true. According to the present worry, however, what is
required for minimal naturalism is something more than an obser-
vation that the structures of the domesticated transcendental are
49 Horacio Fabrega and Hugo Nutini, ‘Witchcraft-Explained
Childhood Tragedies in Tlaxcala, and their Medical Sequelae’, Social
Science and Medicine 36 (1993), 793–805.
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sometimes revised through contact with science, but rather a meth-
odological principle which instructs us that, in the relevant circum-
stances of conflict (as identified earlier), those structures should be
deliberately and consciously revisited.50
The critic is right that there is a distinction here, but wrong that it
poses any sort of problem for my argument. To be sure, establishing
that transcendental conditions of possibility are open to revision from
science does not secure minimal naturalism itself, since, in principle,
one could presumably agree that the domesticated transcendental is
sometimes shaped by science, while refusing the principle that such
shaping should necessarily be on the cards, as a matter of philosophi-
cal methodology, in the appropriate conflict situations. However,
what the removal of any blanket immunity of the transcendental to
revision from science does achieve is a clearing of the path for
minimal naturalism, by eliminating a potential barrier. With the
path cleared in this manner, the missing naturalistic ingredient,
namely the distinctive methodological principle of conflict resol-
ution, is then imported as part of an additional, positive commitment
to minimal naturalism.
A second threat to the compatibility thesis for which I have been
arguing might seem to come from the pincer-movement combination
of the following two claims: (i) naturalism, however minimal, entails
scientific realism – understood as the generic view that ‘our best
scientific theories give true or approximately true descriptions of ob-
servable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world’51;
(ii) scientific realism is incompatible with the domesticated transcen-
dental. This objection raises a host of subtle and complex issues that I
cannot hope to address in full in the space that remains available tome
here. However, I shall endeavour to do just enough to show that
neither (i) nor (ii) is uncontroversially true, so that at the very least
the matter is not an open and shut case.
Taking (ii) first, it is arguable that it is consistent with the concept
of the domesticated transcendental that one of our cultural practices,
the practice of science, has the special quality of revealing natural en-
tities as they are in themselves, that is, independently of our culturally
conditioned uses and articulations of them. Indeed, I have argued
elsewhere that precisely this kind of scientific realism may tentatively
50 Many thanks to Peter Sullivan (in discussion) for raising this
objection.
51 A. Chakravartty, ‘Scientific Realism’ Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, fall 2011, E.N. Zalta (ed.) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2011/entries/scientific-realism).
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be attributed to theHeidegger ofBeing and Time.52 On this interpret-
ation of Heidegger, when science strips away the holistic contextual
networks of culturally and historically conditioned meanings that
characterize our ordinary dealings with equipment, it reveals a
mind-independent world (what the present-at-hand amounts to on
this account) to which the descriptions provided by our empirical
science may or may not correspond. The Heidegger of this interpret-
ation is the Heidegger who declared that, ‘in the field of natural
science […] nature immediately takes its revenge on a wrong-headed
approach’.53
One might worry that there is a problem waiting in the wings for
this kind of realist gloss, a problem that would have to be faced by
any advocate of the domesticated transcendental who, like
Heidegger, holds that an empirical science will inevitably be struc-
tured in such a way that, in order to deliver any particular example
of its distinctive species of enabling understanding, it must assume
certain basic concepts and principles – the regional ontological foun-
dations of the discipline – that determine the constitutive character of
its target phenomena (see, e.g., the presupposed notion of internal
representation which provides the form of the empirical data mined
from observation and experiment in much cognitive psychology).
In truth, however, the extent to which there is a genuine threat to
scientific realism here turns, in part at least, on exactly how we con-
ceive of the relationship between the ontological foundations in ques-
tion and the ongoing empirical research in the relevant science. For
example, the threat is seemingly less severe if we think of the onto-
logical foundations in question as something akin to the hard core
of a Lakatosian research programme54, and so allow that if those
structures become identified as the source of stalled empirical
models that consistently fail to account for new or historically recal-
citrant data, then the science itself will tend to revise or replace those
presuppositions.Modulo legitimate observations regarding the hard-
to-shift character of certain deeply held background social attitudes
that may shape scientific theories, this principle of the revision of
52 Wheeler, Reconstructing The Cognitive World, 137–8, 152–7; ‘Martin
Heidegger’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 2.4.
53 M. Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1982), 203.
54 Imre Lakatos, ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1970), 91–196.
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fundamental concepts in the face of empirical stagnation or degener-
ation would seem to hold even where the presuppositions in question
have an ‘extra-scientific’, ideological dimension.55 With this prin-
ciple in place, the observation that scientific theories themselves
have historical transcendental conditions does not upset the
minimal naturalist demand that where good science and phenomen-
ological philosophy clash, the phenomenologist has a reason to revisit
her account that the scientist does not have, since, for the naturalist,
the ontological foundations of the science will carry the extra credit of
having indirectly survived the rigours of empirical scientific testing,
through the direct testing of the hypotheses and models that they un-
derpin and shape. This is not to say, of course, that the ontological
foundations of the science in question are necessarily unassailable,
or beyond critique, since even today’s well-supported science may
be discarded in the future, but it does mean that, for the minimal nat-
uralist, there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of
those assumptions.56
Despite the upbeat message of the last few paragraphs, there is of
course something to be said for the claim that scientific realism is in-
compatible with the domesticated transcendental, enough I think
that we ought to be wary of putting all our eggs in the one basket of
defending the compatibilist project by rejecting that claim. As I
55 An example of such a dimension would be the long-standing sexist
distinction in biology between the sperm cell as an active heroic force that
burrows through the egg coat to penetrate the egg and activate the develop-
mental program, and the egg cell as passive matter transported along the fal-
lopian tube until it is assaulted and fertilized by the sperm. This distinction
was duly elaborated over many years by experimental work in biology before
the egg was finally granted its own active contribution. See Emily Martin,
‘The Egg and the Sperm: How Science has Constructed a Romance Based
on Stereotypical Male-Female Roles’, Signs, 9 (1991), 485–501; Evelyn
Fox Keller, ‘Gender and Science’, in D.L. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.), The
Philosophy of Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 398–413.
56 Many thanks to JamesWilliams for discussion of this issue. The pos-
ition sketched at this point in themain text is supposed to be duly sensitive to
Williams’Deleuzian claim that the realm of the transcendental must remain
a space in which critique may happen, rather than simply ‘part of a vast and
gradually filled in account of reality’. See, James Williams, ‘Science and
Dialectics in the Philosophies of Deleuze, Bachelard and DeLanda’,
Paragraph: a Journal of Modern Critical Theory, 29 (2006), 98–114, quota-
tion from page 103. I strongly suspect thatWilliams will judge that I am not
being sensitive enough.
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have indicated, much here depends on precisely what the relationship
is between a science’s ontological foundations and its ongoing empiri-
cal research. Perhaps the more radically Kuhnian one becomes re-
garding that relationship, such that theory change is conceived as
akin to religious conversion,57 the less scientific realism remains a
genuine option. Moreover, there are plenty of textually justified
interpretations of Heidegger, our front-line representative of the
domesticated transcendental, that would shy away from the scientific
realist gloss that I have suggested is a genuine option. Thus, for
example, Dreyfus argues that, for Heidegger, two scientific theories
that contradict each other might conceivably be equally valid ways
of understanding nature.58 In light of these points, it is worth record-
ing that the objection under consideration – the pincermovement rea-
lized by the combination of claims (i) and (ii) above – might also be
blocked by a recognition that claim (i) – the claim that naturalism,
however minimal, entails scientific realism – is strictly false. If it is
possible to articulate minimal naturalism in a scientific anti-realist
register – defined as a register in which at least one component of
the realist picture is denied – then any incompatibility of scientific
realism and the domesticated transcendental is of less concern to
the present project. So, can this be done? The answer, I think, is
yes: minimal naturalism, as I have depicted it, demands only that
philosophy be consistent with empirical science. It leaves open the
question of whether science is best conceived in realist or anti-
realist terms. Admittedly, when I characterized minimal naturalism
initially, I did so, somewhat hesitantly, by way of an unanalysed
notion of approximate truth and the vague idea of a complete and
correct final science towards which we are, in some sense, progres-
sing. This way of talking has an undeniably realist ring to it.
However, the formulation of minimal naturalism with which I
ended up relaxed the realist-sounding teleological component, re-
quiring only the notion of an eminently well-supported science as
part of its demand that, if and when there is a genuine clash
between philosophy and some empirically buttressed science, there
is good reason for the philosopher to at least revisit her claims, with
a view to withdrawal or revision. This formulation of the minimal
naturalist constraint is consistent with a range of anti-realist accounts
of science. Indeed, even if one thought that the idea that philosophy
57 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962/1970, second edition, with postscript).
58 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, 261–2.
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should reconsider itself in the wake of a genuine clash with science
could be secured only given a sense of scientific progress, there are
anti-realist views of science that make room for such progress. For
example, Kuhn replaces the standard (realist) cumulative notion of
progress in science with one cashed out in terms of increases in
puzzle-solving power.59 If minimal naturalism does not entail scien-
tific realism, then, even if the domesticated transcendental is in
tension with such realism (which I am not convinced it is), that
would not render minimal naturalism and the domesticated transcen-
dental incompatible with each other. The pincer-movement objec-
tion to the compatibility project under consideration is thus
significantly less cogent that first impressions might have suggested.
If the arguments I have offered in this section are correct, then the
‘something nasty’ that we glimpsed in the conceptual woodshed oc-
cupied by phenomenological cognitive science turns out to be more
of a snapping terrier than a growling Rottweiler. That woodshed is
thus revealed to be a philosophically benign, or at least a not ob-
viously philosophically hostile, place to reside.
7. Time for a Song
With the transcendental domesticated and with naturalism made
minimal, there is no palpable conflict between transcendental phe-
nomenology and naturalism. Under these interpretations, the trans-
cendental phenomenologist and the philosophical naturalist, just
like the feuding figures of the farmer and the cowman in the song
by Rodgers and Hammerstein, should forget their differences and
be friends. After some twists and turns in the plot, the eventual
outcome in Oklahoma is that Laurey and Curly get married and
leave for their honeymoon in the surrey with the fringe on top. The
outcome here is a reconciliation that reveals the philosophical creden-
tials of phenomenological cognitive science to be in good order. So,
despite how things looked at the beginning of our investigation, the
point at which the transcendental dimension of phenomenology
meets the naturalistic dimension of cognitive science is not necess-
arily the site of a barrier to an alliance between these two modes of
inquiry. Conceptual space is thus secured for precisely the kind of
neo-McDowellian interplay that, as we have seen, has been emerging
within the work itself. This dynamic of selective mutual constraint
59 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 160ff.
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and influence which characterizes this interplay means that the fric-
tion in force here is of the positive (productive) and not the negative
(antagonistic) kind. Now that does sound like the basis for a success-
ful intellectual marriage.60
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m.w.wheeler@stir.ac.uk
60 Some sections of this paper include passages of text adapted
from: Cappuccio and Wheeler, ‘Ground-Level Intelligence’; Wheeler,
‘Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged) Heresies’. For useful critical dis-
cussion of the ideas presented here, many thanks to James Williams, and
to audiences at Bochum, Bristol, Copenhagen, Hull, Lyon and Stirling.
Thanks also to Havi Carel for valuable editorial feedback.
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